Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 by Pedriana, Nicholas
Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and




IN TRODU CTION .................................................................................................... 1
I. TITLE VII'S SEX PROVISION AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT .................... 3
II. THE EEOC AND THE EMERGENCE OF NOW ............................................. 4
III. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT .......... 7
IV. PREGNANCY AND TITLE VII IN THE LOWER COURTS .............................. 9
V. FROM GILBERT TO THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT ........................ 11
C ON CLU SION ................................................................................................. 13
Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a
case such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice...
an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing
general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all.
- Justice William H. Rehnqluist, writing for the majority in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
INTRODUCTION
The ink had barely dried on the Supreme Court's 1976 opinion in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert when a coalition of women's activists, feminist lawyers,
civil rights groups, and labor organizations began drafting legislation to nullify
the Court's ruling. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the 1978 Pregnancy
2Discrimination Act (PDA). The PDA overturned Gilbert by amending Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act3 to explicitly prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions. The
PDA made clear once and for all that pregnancy discrimination was, by
definition, sex discrimination barred by Title VII.
t Visiting lecturer at Northwestern University, Center for Legal Studies.
1. 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-el7 (2000).
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This Article traces the historical, legal, and cultural forces that converged
to place the rights of pregnant women at the forefront of employment
discrimination policy in the early- to mid-1970s. The story, to be sure, is a
complicated and multi-dimensional one, and space limitations preclude a
comprehensive narrative that fully captures all the contours and complexities of
this crucial event in society's ongoing struggle to combat sex discrimination in
the workplace. Rather, I chronicle what I consider to be among the key contexts
and sequences of action that helped usher in transformations in both the
symbolism and substance of sex discrimination law in ways that led eventually
to the PDA. Such developments certainly include, but are not limited to, major
judicial rulings. Making sense of pregnancy discrimination law requires that we
take seriously the wider, dynamic contexts in which courts and judges were
situated: contexts that include the early history of Title VII's sex provision; the
fledgling attempts of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to interpret the sex provision; and key organizational and philosophical
transformations in a resurgent women's movement increasingly committed to
full equal treatment in the workplace.
Early debates over pregnancy discrimination unfolded within a broader
cultural and legal examination of gender roles and stereotypes in American
society generally, and in the workforce specifically. Many gender-based job
classifications were grounded in taken-for-granted sex roles and stereotypes
that justified disparate treatment in the workplace. And since pregnancy was
arguably the single best example of gender difference, it reinforced widely held
assumptions that women's childbearing capacity was paramount to all other
social roles, including those of job and career. Of course the roots of these
debates stretched back decades and did not spontaneously appear in the mid-
1960s. Still, the historical record strongly suggests that the somewhat
unexpected inclusion of sex in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's
prohibition of employment discrimination lit a spark that quickly elevated
women's employment rights-including the rights of pregnant women-from
the periphery to the center of American law, culture, and politics.
All that said, this Article is not an analysis of the PDA itself. I do not
provide an in-depth examination of the legislative debate over the PDA,
although I do briefly reference some of the highlights of that debate in later
sections. Nor does my time frame go beyond passage of the Act in 1978. Thus
the PDA's subsequent impact on society-legally, culturally, politically, or
otherwise-is outside the scope of this Article. To restate, my core objective is
to outline and illuminate the key historical sequences and socio-legal raw
materials that, together, helped transform the legal rules and cultural
sensibilities about the employment rights of pregnant workers, culminating
with the PDA's enactment in 1978.
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I. TITLE VII'S SEX PROVISION AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
Many (but not all) legal scholars and women's movement historians concur
that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination was a historical accident . The
most influential women's groups at the time-organized largely in the "status
of women" committees originally created by President Kennedy--did not
actively lobby for the sex provision. Rather, it is widely understood that a
conservative southern Congressman proposed the addition in an amendment as
a way of potentially derailing the pending civil rights bill. After brief debate on
the House floor, the amendment passed, cleared the Senate with apparently
even less debate, and was signed into law as part of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 5
Title VII's sex provision caught many women's activists off-guard. Most
women's organizations generally favored equal employment opportunities for
women; yet this general consensus was complicated by their simultaneous-
and longstanding-commitment to protective labor legislation for women.
Protective laws were originally designed-by women's advocates
themselves-to shield women from dangerous or burdensome work
requirements that interfered with their primary roles as mothers, wives, and
homemakers. 6 By the mid-1960s, however, even proponents had grown
skeptical that many protective laws, such as maximum hours and weightlifting
limits, were out of date and put substantial obstacles in the path of women's
career advancement. Nonetheless, many of these same women's leaders did not
favor repeal of protective laws altogether; instead, they believed the laws
should be updated in ways that still offered women necessary and genuine
protections without unduly interfering with their work and career opportunities.
This position was best summarized by Mary Keyserling, head of the Women's
Bureau within the Department of Labor, at a White House conference on equal
employment opportunity shortly after Title VII's passage: "[T]hese laws were
4. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICY 1960-1972, at 136-39 (1990); CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF
WOMEN'S ISSUES 1945-1968 (1988); Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal
Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women's Movement in the 1960s, I II AM. J. OF SOC.
1718, 1732-33 (2006).
5. Some Title VII scholars, however, argue that the derailment view is overstated. Jo Freeman, for
example, suggests that the insertion of the sex provision was not as cynical or deceptive as others
assume. She provides evidence that a handful of more conservative women's advocates had lobbied
Rep. Smith behind the scenes, thus calling into question the conclusion that Smith's amendment was
little more than a spontaneous joke. See Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VIL: Persistent
Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991); see also Carl M. Brauer, Women
Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37 (1983).
6. See, e.g., JUDITH BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S
LABOR LEGISLATION (1978); Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1975); THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992).
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put on the books by women's organizations in the interest of women... [and]
sought to eliminate the real abuses which prevailed widely in industry7.. , the
freeing of women from employment discrimination does not demand that they
all have identical treatment."
8
Yet there was a fundamental problem: Title VII was unambiguously
written in the language of equal treatment, making it unlawful "to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 9 Employers were thus
prohibited from discriminating on account of sex. But protective labor laws, by
definition, discriminated on account of sex. This simple fact intensified debate
between women's advocates who sought to retain protective laws, and a
growing number who believed that such laws were no longer necessary or
beneficial for women, and thus should be rescinded altogether.' 0 This debate
was far more than mere technical differences over policy, however.
Disagreements over the status of protective laws under Title VII contributed to
an accelerating and potentially transformative cultural discourse of gender: a
discourse that embraced rapidly changing ideas about sex stereotypes, taken-
for-granted gender roles, and how both impacted women's opportunities
outside the home generally, and in the workplace specifically. Within a few
years, the discourse of full equality for women had gotten the clear upper hand
over traditional gender sensibilities that assumed women were fundamentally
different-biologically and culturally-than men in ways that justified female-
specific protections in the workplace." Either way, by the time major conflict
emerged over pregnancy discrimination in the early 1970s, the EEOC, several
state anti-discrimination agencies, and many state and federal courts had
already begun (with some notable exceptions) to interpret Title VII to require
full legal equality for women workers.
II. THE EEOC AND THE EMERGENCE OF NOW
After several years of intense debate in the mid-to-late 1960s, the EEOC by
the early 1970s had generally settled on a strong equal treatment interpretation
of Title VII's sex provision. For example, Title VII carved out an exception to
the non-discrimination requirement in instances where sex was a "bona fide
7. EEOC, White House Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity, Discrimination Because of
Sex 22 (August 19-20, 1965) (panel transcript available in the EEOC Library, Washington, D.C.).
8. Id. at 26.
9. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
10. See Mary Eastwood & Pauli Murray, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232, 248-53 (1965) (discussing controversy over Title Vil's interaction
with state protective laws and concluding that it would be difficult to harmonize the anti-discrimination
command with the state laws).
i1. See Pedriana, supra note 4.
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occupational qualification" (BFOQ). 12 Spurred on by women's activists, the
EEOC issued interpretive guidelines that narrowly construed the BFOQ
exception: "[T]he bona fide occupational qualification will not be allowed on
the bases of assumptions of employment characteristics in general or
stereotyped images of the sexes."' 3 Yet in a bizarre reversal of this general
position, the agency subsequently ruled that employers could continue to place
job ads in sex-segregated columns in the classified employment sections of
newspapers (for example, column headings that read "help wanted male" or
"help wanted female"). In fact, the EEOC's early intransigence on
discriminatory help-wanted ads stunned and angered virtually all women's
advocates, and was among the defining conflicts that led to formation of the
National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966.14 After battling for several
years with the EEOC and major newspaper publishers, NOW and other
women's groups finally convinced the Commission to rewrite its employment
advertising guidelines to flatly prohibit employers from placing job ads in sex-
designated newspaper columns, or to state in any other way a gender preference
in job advertisements. 15
Once NOW entered the political scene in late 1966, activists quickly
embraced a full commitment to equal treatment under the law, and any
lingering debates over protective policies abruptly disappeared. Almost
immediately, NOW pressured both the EEOC and the federal courts to
dismantle all sex-specific employment practices, including protective labor
laws. For several years the EEOC had waffled-in ways that bordered on
incoherence--on the question of whether Title VII's blanket ban on sex
discrimination preempted state laws that required sex-specific protective
classifications. The Commission first ruled that employers could cite state
protective laws as a valid BFOQ to avoid Title VII liability; shortly thereafter it
changed its mind and decided to punt the entire issue to the courts; the
Commission later shifted again by stating it would deal with protective laws on
a case-by-case basis. 16
Meanwhile, NOW continued to push the EEOC to invalidate state
protective laws and filed a series of key lawsuits in the federal courts. In Weeks
v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 17 the Fifth Circuit reversed the
12. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e) (2000).
13. 1 EEOC, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION DURING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON, NOVEMBER 1963-JANUARY 1969, at 239 (1968) (available
at Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, TX).
14. See BETrY FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY LIFE: WRITINGS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1991);
Freeman, supra note 5; Nicholas Pedriana, Help Wanted NOW: Legal Resources, the Women's
Movement, and the Battle Over Sex-Segregated Job Advertisements, 51 SOC. PROBLEMS 182 (2004).
15. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Issues Guidelines on Classified Advertising, Rules Separate
Male-Female Ads Illegal (Aug. 6, 1968) (on file with author); see also HARRISON, supra note 4, at 190;
Pedriana, supra note 14; Newspaper Want-Ads, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1968, at 1.
16. See Pedriana, supra note 4.
17. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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district court's ruling that Southern Bell's blanket exclusion of women from the
job of "switchman" fell under Title VII's BFOQ exemption. Two years later in
Rosenberg v. Southern Pacific, 18 the Ninth Circuit not only affirmed the district
court's invalidation of California's twenty-five-pound lifting limit for women
workers, it ruled more generally that all state protective laws illegally
discriminated against women, writing, "It would appear that these state law
limitations upon female labor run contrary to the general objectives of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as reviewed above, and are therefore, by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause, supplanted by Title VII."' 19 In response, the EEOC
unequivocally ruled-in yet another update of its interpretive guidelines-that
state protective laws violated Title VII and could not be cited as a BFOQ
defense. Within a few years, nearly all state protective policies disappeared
forever. 20
In short, by the time major cultural and legal debate over the rights of
pregnant workers began in the early 1970s, the women's movement, the courts,
and the EEOC had already converged-however clunkily and disjointedly--on
a general, across-the-board equal treatment approach to sex discrimination and
women's employment rights. Under Title VII, employers could no longer rely
and act upon traditional gender stereotypes to justify sex classifications in the
workplace. The law required that women workers be treated as individuals
rather than as members of a generalized class subject to outdated cultural
sensibilities and practices. There was perhaps good reason, then, for cautious
optimism that the issue of pregnancy would be swept up in the equal treatment
momentum that was helping redefine the discourse of gender in and out of the
women's movement, the EEOC, and the courts. For example, in 1972 the
EEOC issued new interpretive guidelines that unambiguously required equal
treatment of pregnant workers: "Disabilities caused or contributed to by
pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in
connection with employment.",
21
In addition, a solid judicial consensus emerged in the district and appellate
courts that pregnancy-based classifications were by definition sex-based
classifications prohibited by Title VII. That said, the earliest pregnancy cases to
reach the federal courts were constitutional challenges brought against state and
municipal employers 22 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
18. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 1225.
20. See BAER, supra note 6; Freeman, supra note 5.
21. 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 § 1604.10(b) (Mar. 31, 1972).
22. This was possible because state and local employers were not covered by Title VII until 1972.
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Amendment. 23 Several of these cases foreshadowed many of the arguments and
rulings that would soon follow in the subsequent wave of pregnancy
discrimination cases under Title VII.
III. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In a series of sex-discrimination cases in the early 1970s, the Supreme
Court had struck down several state-imposed gender classifications in part by
subjecting sex distinctions to greater judicial scrutiny. 24 Thus, the Equal
Protection Clause seemed a promising legal avenue for women workers
alleging pregnancy discrimination by their government employers. The
Supreme Court in 1974 first confronted such a claim in Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,25 a typical early pregnancy discrimination case. Public
school teachers who became pregnant were required to take maternity leave
beginning at the fifth month of pregnancy. LaFleur challenged the policy,
arguing that the five-month rule was arbitrary and failed to acknowledge the
growing evidence and medical consensus that many women were capable of
working well into the later stages of their pregnancies. Thus, the five-month
rule was driven by inaccurate gender stereotypes rather than an individualized
determination as to whether a pregnant school teacher could adequately
perform her job duties. The district court disagreed and ruled that the maternity
leave policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court accepted the
Board's argument that the policy was a constitutionally permissible means to
ensure its legitimate interests in ensuring continuity of classroom education and
protecting pregnant teachers' health. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed, arguing that the Board's maternity leave policy discriminated against
pregnant women without constitutional justification.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the five-month rule violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, but based its decision on the Due Process Clause,
rather than on equal protection grounds. Building on the Court's substantive
due process and privacy rights jurisprudence-including Griswold v.
Connecticut26 and Roe v. Wade27 -Justice Stewart wrote that the right to
23. See, e.g., Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Sch. Dist., 387 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Minn. 1974); Crawford
v. Cushman, 378 F. Supp. 717 (D. Vt. 1974), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976); deLaurier v. San
Diego Sch. Dist., No. 74-176-E, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6115 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1974); Aiello v.
Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ,, 349 F. Supp. 687 (D.
Conn. 1972), rev'd, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Williams v. S.F. Sch. Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Schattman v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 459
F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972); Cohen v. Chesterfield Sch. Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd, 467
F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
24. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25. 414 U.S. 642 (1974).
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
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decide whether or not to bear a child was fundamental, and thus that state
policies that substantially interfered with such a decision were an
unconstitutional infringement on individual liberty. Mandatory leave policies
that forced women out of the workplace for extended periods might put
substantial economic and/or career pressure on them to delay or forego
pregnancy, thereby unduly interfering with fundamental rights involving family
and childbearing. Yet because the Court avoided the case's equal protection
dimension, it left key questions about pregnancy-based classifications
unanswered. Most importantly, LaFleur did not directly address whether
pregnancy discrimination was tantamount to sex discrimination, a central
question-in and out of the courts-that would eventually lead to passage of
the PDA in 1978.
In Geduldig v. Aiello28 the Supreme Court confronted another
constitutional question that would subsequently become among the most
contested statutory questions about pregnancy discrimination under Title VII:
whether employers could legally exclude pregnancy from temporary disability,
sick leave, or other income protection benefits. At issue was California's
disability insurance fund for private employees experiencing a temporary
disability or sickness not covered by workman's compensation. The fund,
however, excluded certain conditions including those associated with normal
pregnancy. The Court found no constitutional violation, writing that "[the fund]
does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible
for disability insurance protection under the program. The classification
challenged in this case relates to the asserted underinclusiveness of the set of
risks that the State has selected to insure." 29 Nor according to the Court was
there any evidence "that the selection of the risks insured by the program
worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the
aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program."
30
Geduldig was not a Title VII case, but it was a possible signal of things to
come. A majority of the justices appeared to think that pregnancy-based
distinctions generally, and with respect to benefits packages specifically, was
not a sex-based classification. If so, then not only did pregnancy-based
exclusions like the one in Geduldig not violate the Constitution, but they quite
possibly did not violate Title VII, either.
IV. PREGNANCY AND TITLE VII IN THE LOWER COURTS
Throughout the early 1970s, the lower federal courts were extremely
receptive to Title VII plaintiffs claiming pregnancy discrimination. In a
28. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
29. Id. at 494.
30. Id. at 496.
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substantial number of cases between 1971 and 1975, district courts addressed
the substantive question of whether pregnancy discrimination was
indistinguishable from sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The vast
majority concluded that it was. One court, dealing with a board of education's
maternity leave policy bluntly wrote, "It is the opinion of this Court that
whereas here a woman is compelled to take maternity leave of absence because
of pregnancy and where such person is capable of performing her job
adequately, that to force maternity leave upon her is a violation [of Title
VII].''31 Another court, in striking down a company's exclusion of pregnancy
from its temporary disability plan concluded: "[P]regnancy is the only
disability . . . not covered by the Income Protection Plan. Pregnancy is a
condition limited to women. Conditions limited to men, such as prostate
troubles, are not excluded, nor is any exclusion provided for a number of
illnesses whose incidence among males is greatly predominant." 32 Other
district courts made similar findings and employed similar language. 33
The appellate circuits were equally friendly to pregnancy discrimination
claims. In a series of key decisions in 1975, appeals courts affirmed lower court
rulings that Title VII prohibited pregnancy discrimination in nearly all its
forms 34 and reversed courts that concluded otherwise. 35 One of the affirmed
cases was Gilbert v. General Electric.36 At issue was G.E.'s non-occupational
sickness and accident plan that excluded "sickness or other disabilities arising
31. Singer v. Mahonig Bd. of Mental Retardation, 379 F. Supp. 986, 989 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd,
519 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1975).
32. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199
(3d Cir. 1975).
33. See EEOC v. Barnes Hosp., No. 75-545 C(3), 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14682 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 22,
1975); Stansell v. Sherman-Williams Co., 404 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ga. 1975); McArthur v. S. Airways,
404 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Polston v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 7685-A, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16516 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 1975); Oakland Fed'n of Teachers v. Oakland United Sch. Dist., No. C74
1768 WTS, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11410 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 1975); Valiant v. Bristol-Meyers Co., No.
74-137-C(2), 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12198 (E.D. Mo. May 27, 1975); Liss v. Sch. Dist., 396 F. Supp.
1035 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Zichy v. Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Sale v. Waverly-Shell
Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765
(M.D. Tenn. 1974), affd, 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975); Vineyard v. Hollister Elementary Sch. Dist., No.
C-73-1821 WHO, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5987 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1974); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego
Sch. Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Or. 1974), affd, 519 F. 2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975); Farkas v. S.W. City
Sch. Dist., No. C2 73-169, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9094 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 1974); Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Lillo v. Plymouth
Local Bd. of Educ., 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11651 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 1973); Dessenberg v. Am. Metal
Forming Co., No. C72-48T, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11650 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 1973); Healen v. E.
Airlines, Inc., No. 18097, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11973 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 1973); Vick v. Tex.
Employment Comm'n, No. 70-H-1 164, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12104 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 1973); Doe
v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n,
330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
34. Berg v. Richmond United Sch. Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas
Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
35. Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975); Comm'n Workers v. AT&T,
513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975).
36. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
1975), rev'd429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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from pregnancy, miscarriage or childbirth. 37 A year earlier, the district court
had struck down G.E.'s policy, relying heavily on the EEOC's revised 1972
guidelines requiring that pregnancy be treated like any other temporary
disability. In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit spoke clearly:
Pregnancy is a condition unique to women and a basic characteristic of
their sex. A disability program which, while granting disability
benefits generally, denies such benefits expressly for disability arising
out of pregnancy, a disability possible only among women, is
manifestly one which can result in a less comprehensive program of
employee compensation and benefits for women employees than for
men employees; and would do so on the basis of sex. . . . In so
concluding, we are following the opinion reached by most of the
Courts which have considered the issue and are giving effect to the
construction of the Act as adopted by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in its guidelines, to which the courts are
directed to give "great deference" in applying the Act.
38
The court further addressed GE's claim that the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Geduldig that pregnancy-excluding benefits plans did not unlawfully
discriminate on the basis of sex should control the present case. The appeals
court countered that Geduldig was a constitutional challenge to a legislative act
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In
contrast, GE's plan was challenged under statutory law:
To satisfy constitutional Equal Protection standards, a discrimination
need only be "rationally supportable" and that was the situation in
Aiello [v. Geduldig] . . . . Title VII, however, authorizes no such
"rationality" test . . . . It represents a flat and absolute prohibition
against all sex discrimination in conditions of employment . . . . It
outlaws all sex discrimination in the conditions of employment .... Its
denial of pregnancy-related disability from the application of its
employee disability benefit program, in our opinion, falls clearly
within the prohibitions of Title VII and Aiello confers no immunity for
such denial. The District Court properly so held. 3
Thus by the time General Electric v. Gilbert reached the Supreme Court,
almost all the district courts, and six appeals courts, had each come to the same
conclusion that Title VII prohibited pregnancy discrimination, including
exclusion of pregnancy from benefits packages. 40 Nonetheless, the Court's 6-3
majority reversed the Fourth Circuit, ruling that G.E.'s exclusion of pregnancy
from its sickness and accident plan did not violate Title VII. The Court
acknowledged that, unlike Geduldig, Gilbert was a Title VII case not
technically subject to constitutional/equal protection scrutiny. Yet the majority
37. Id. at 368-69.
38. 519 F.2d at 664.
39. Id. at 667.
40. See, e.g., Equality Sometimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1976, at 17; cases cited supra note 33.
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saw a fundamental continuity between the two cases that transcended
constitutional versus statutory distinctions. The Court argued, as it had in
Geduldig, that differences in treatment on account of pregnancy were not per se
differences in treatment on account of sex. Rather, pregnancy was a particular
condition and pregnant women were simply a subset of women generally. Thus
when an employer excluded pregnancy from temporary disabilities plans, it
was not, as a matter of law, discriminating on the basis of sex at all, but only
treating one particular medical condition less favorably than others:
There is no more showing in this case than there was in Geduldig that
the exclusion of pregnancy benefits is a mere "pretex[t] designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other" ..... [W]e have here no question of excluding a disease or
disability comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or
disabilities and yet confined to the members of one race or sex.
Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways
significantly different from the typical covered disease or
disability .... We do not therefore infer that the exclusion of
pregnancy disability benefits from petitioner's plan is a simple pretext
for discriminating against women.
V. FROM GILBERT TO THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
The response among women's activists to the Gilbert decision was
immediate and vocal. In light of the movement's recent transformation towards
unequivocal embrace of equal treatment, the ruling was harshly criticized as an
affront to workplace equality. At the same time, by permitting exclusion of
pregnancy-related benefits, Gilbert was also assailed, as one NOW
spokesperson put it, as a "slap in the face to motherhood., 42 Two days after it
was handed down, the New York Times wrote that the decision "outraged
women's rights advocates .... labor and women's groups said yesterday that
they were preparing legislation to counteract the decision and require that
disability plans provide for the payment of wages to women out of work
because of pregnancy." 43 A few days later, feminist lawyers and women's
groups announced formation of the "Coalition to End Discrimination Against
Pregnant Workers" and vowed to "work to draft legislation to combat the high
court ruling.",44 Shortly thereafter, Congress introduced legislation reversing
Gilbert and held hearings beginning in early 1977.
41. 429 U.S. at 136.
42. Feminist Leaders Plan Coalition for Law Aiding Pregnant Women, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1976,
at 40.
43. Damon Stetson, Women Vow Fight for Pregnancy Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1976, at 19.
44. Feminist Leaders, supra note 42.
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The proposed legislation was remarkably simple. The PDA would do
nothing more than add a single, short paragraph (subsection "k") to Section 701
of Title VII, which read:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions, and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work, and nothins in Section 703(h) of this
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
In addition to women's advocates, a long list of witnesses urging enactment
testified at House and Senate hearings including members of Congress, the
EEOC, and other government agencies, along with feminist lawyers,
physicians, and representatives from the AFL-CIO; the International Union of
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers; the American Civil Liberties Union;
and the NAACP. The unanimous view that pregnancy discrimination was,
fundamentally, a denial of equal rights for all women in the workplace was
perhaps best summarized by Susan Ross in a statement prepared on behalf of
the Coalition to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers. Explicitly
mobilizing equality and equal treatment discourse, Ross told Congress:
[S]ince most women workers do bear children at some point in their
working lives, this one decision [Gilbert] could thus be used to justify
a whole complex of discriminatory employment practices designed to
insure that women wo[r]ker's role in the market place be confined to
low-paying, dead-end jobs . . . . Employers routinely fire pregnant
workers, refuse to hire them, strip them of seniority rights, and deny
them sick leave and medical benefits given other workers. Such
policies have a lifetime impact on women's careers. Together, they add
up to one basic fact: employers use women's role of childbearer as the
central justification of and support for discrimination against women
workers. Thus, discrimination against women workers cannot be
eradicated unless the root discrimination, based on pregnancy and
childbirth, is also eliminated.46
By contrast, opposition to the PDA's central premise-that employers must
treat pregnancy like any other temporary medical condition-seemed
somewhat half-hearted and perfunctory.47 The central critique emphasized the
45. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055
and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 95th Cong. I (1977).
46. Id. at 31-32 (statement of Susan Deller Ross, Campaign to End Discrimination Against
Pregnant Workers).
47. 1 say this with the important caveat that there was a major point of contention over the PDA
about whether it would cover women who had abortions. The final version did allow employers to
exclude elective abortions, unless carrying the fetus to term threatened the mother's life or if there were
medical complications resulting from abortion. To be sure, many women's activists were outraged over
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potentially prohibitive costs that the PDA might impose on employers. I make
no authoritative claims as to why the debate was apparently so one-sided. Still,
one might reasonably speculate that, by 1976, the Gilbert ruling was simply out
of touch with an expanding cultural and political discourse of gender organized
around the principles and language of women's equality. As I partly chronicled
above, the major actors-from the EEOC to the lower courts to the women's
movement to Congress-were, to greater or lesser extents tilted towards gender
equality and away from the usual suspects of biological and cultural difference
that traditionally justified discrimination against women workers generally, and
pregnant employees in particular. Either way, in lopsided votes, the PDA
passed the House and Senate, and was signed into law by President Carter.
CONCLUSION
Enactment of the PDA was a great victory for women's employment rights,
one that continued the slow and choppy, but nonetheless steady movement
towards equal treatment for women workers under Title VII. This introductory
Article has visited some of the key historical events and sequences through
which pregnancy discrimination came to be viewed-legally and culturally-as
a pressing social problem requiring legal redress. The PDA was of course made
possible in part by the combined interaction of employer behavior, court
rulings, and EEOC interpretations of Title VII. At the same time, a rapidly
changing cultural discourse of gender--one that aggressively challenged taken-
for-granted sex-roles and gender stereotypes in and out of the home and
workplace-also had a fundamental impact on the expansion of legal
protections for women workers generally, and for pregnant workers
specifically. And it was a resurgent women's movement unequivocally
committed to full legal equality for women workers that was arguably most
responsible for constructing, mobilizing, and diffusing an aggressive equal
treatment discourse that partly transformed both the cultural norms and legal
rules governing the rights and opportunities of working women who would or
might become pregnant.
Yet the PDA was in many ways not the end, but the beginning, of society's
ongoing-and too often insufficient-attempts to secure the rights and
opportunities of women workers. Female employees throughout the nation
continue to face lingering stereotypes about their primary family and
childbearing roles in ways that still routinely elicit discriminatory treatment at
all levels of the employment relationship. In recent decades legislation
the abortion exemption. Thus my claim that there was not much of an organized opposition to the PDA
refers to its central principle that, notwithstanding elective abortion, pregnancy discrimination was sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. See Pregnancy Disability Rights, CQ ALMANAC 1978 (1979),
available at http://library.cqpress.comlcqalmanac/cqa78-1239650.
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providing for family leave has attempted to supplement laws like the PDA to
ensure that workers need not make the cruel choice between their careers and
their family obligations. Whether and to what extent such efforts have been
successful is beyond this Article's purview. In either case, the PDA blazed the
trail by establishing formal rights and a system of legal redress available to
pregnant workers facing discrimination in the workplace.
